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Abstract 
We present a design-based research on students’ reasoning evolution about the randomness 
and the decision making in a chance game. The research is supported theoretically in the 
analysis of how the complex and multifaceted notion of decision emerged and evolved 
simultaneously to the notions of randomness and probability. This theoretical framework 
has been used to retrospectively analyse the theoretical foundations of students taking part 
in the research (ages 15 and 16) on the decisions to be made to win in the game and how 
these decisions were based on the different conceptions about the randomness of the 
generator and the generated sequences of events. We conclude that the nature granted to the 
decisions made to win and the randomness granted to the game have evolved 
simultaneously. 
Keywords: Randomness, decision-making, design based research, secondary school 
Resumen 
Presentamos una investigación basada en el diseño sobre evolución del razonamiento del 
alumnado sobre la aleatoriedad y la toma de decisiones en un juego de azar. La 
investigación se sustenta teóricamente en el análisis de cómo la compleja y multifacética 
noción de decisión ha emergido y evolucionado a la par de las nociones de aleatoriedad y 
probabilidad. Este marco teórico ha sido la base para el análisis retrospectivo para 
identificar los sustentos teóricos del alumnado participante en la investigación (15 y 16 
años) sobre las decisiones a tomar para ganar en el juego y cómo dichas decisiones se 
basaban en las diferentes concepciones sobre la aleatoriedad del generador y de las 
secuencias generadas. Se concluye que la naturaleza otorgada a las decisiones tomadas para 
ganar y la aleatoriedad otorgada al juego han evolucionado a la par.  
Keywords: Aleatoriedad, riesgo, toma de decisiones, investigaciones basadas en el diseño 
1. Introduction 
Educational design based research (DBR) has been a substantial educational research 
framework to provide theoretical and empirical grounded products for stochastic 
education. In this relatively new research approach, the design of educational materials 
is a crucial part of the research (Bakker & van Eerde, 2014). DBR has different 
approaches that differ if they are grounded on theory or empirical products (Engeström, 
2011). Two examples of DBR are substantial to ground the theoretical approach of the 
DBR presented in this paper. 
On the one hand, Abrahamson (2012) presented a DBR that investigated the cognition 
and instruction of probability. The construct of an epistemic resource emerged with his 
attempt to respond to empirical findings about the research assumption that, when 
analysing compound-events random generators, students typically do not appreciate the 
relevance of order among singleton events (Batanero, Navarro-Pelayo, & Godino, 
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1997). He concluded that a learner could make appropriate mathematical analysis of 
compound-events by objectifying pre-symbolic notions of probability using a 
customized event space (Abrahamson, 2012).  In this paper, this mathematical analysis 
of compound-events by objectifying pre-symbolic notions of probability would be a 
point of depart of a trajectory that aims to identify students’ reasoning on decision 
making under situations of uncertainty and of risk. 
On the other hand, Bakker and van Eerde (2014) presented an example of a DBR to 
answer the question of how can we promote coherent reasoning about distribution in 
relation to data, variability and sampling in a way that is meaningful for students with 
little statistical background. In particular, Bakker and Gravemejer (2004) presented a 
theoretical framework to analyse the relation between data and distribution. The 
structure of this theoretical framework can be read upward and downward. In the 
upward perspective novice students perceive the individual values of the data to 
construct the notion of frequency distribution of a data set. In the downward perspective 
students use probability distributions to model data. Moreover, they conjecture that 
experts in statistics can easily combine the upward and downward perspectives.  
The combination between this upward/downward perspective about the relationship 
between the frequency distribution of a data set and the probability is not unique. From 
a probabilistic perspective, Nilsson, Eckert and Pratt (2018) examine the challenges and 
opportunities of experimentation-based instruction in the learning of the bi-directional 
relationship between a classical a priori and a frequentist model of probability 
(Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014). Nilsson et al. (2018) concluded about the need to take a 
fine-grained account of the social and situational nature of how students express and 
develop an understanding of randomness and probability in particular learning 
environments.  
In 2015 when initiating a DBR, the social and situational nature of game of chance 
enviroment was taken into account to design the Integer Addition Bingo (IAB) task 
(Serradó 2018). In general, this DBR had the purpose of enhancing the stochastic 
reasoning of 48 Spanish students (Grade 7, age 12) when making decisions in situations 
involving uncertainty and risk. In particular, the task was designed with the aim of 
improving students’ learning and reasoning about risk management through a process of 
understanding the random nature of the game. The retrospective analysis of the DBR, 
presented in Serradó (2018), lead us to identify four mental levels of reasoning: (a) pre-
structural, where decisions are based on personal preference; (b) uni-structural, where 
decisions are rationally bound in situations of uncertainty; (c) multi-structural, where 
decisions are rationally bound either in situations of uncertainty or in situations of risk; 
and, (d) relational, when decisions are rationally bound either in situations of 
uncertainty and of risk.  Moreover, six learning trajectories were identified. Three of 
these trajectories are interesting for this paper because they informed about a restricted 
progression from pre-structural to uni-structural reasoning. The evolution to a higher 
level of reasoning was constricted by a deterministic view of the chance game, the 
difficulties of discerning between the randomness of the generator, the randomness of 
the events and the sequences of events, and a lack of previous knowledge about 
measures of centrer for frequency distributions. 
In order to surpass these difficulties, Serradó (2018) suggested to initiate a second cycle 
of DBR through improving the IAB task design. Three improvements were suggested: 
(a) engaging students in a dialogue about the uncertainty of the randomly generated 
numbers; (b) reasoning about the differences between the numbers randomly generated 
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by the IAB random generator and the random events obtained by the addition of the 
randomly-generated numbers; and, (c) facilitating students’ ability to discriminate 
between events and sequences of events. 
In this paper, we present a second retrospective analysis considering the cyclic nature of 
DBR (Cobb, Confrey, diSessa, Lehrer, & Schauble, 2003). This retrospective analysis 
aims to analyse the evolution of students’s reasoning about the random nature granted to 
the IAB generator, the events and sequences of events generated, and the decisions 
made. 
2. Decision making in situations of uncertainty and of risk 
Over the past decade several studies have advanced in the understanding of what 
decisions are, how decision-making skill is acquired and its acquisition measured (e.g. 
Baron, 2008; Chen, Moskowitz & Shue, 2016; Cokely et al., 2018; Gigerenzer, 2002). 
In particular, Cokely et al. (2018) integrative review of skilled human decision making 
describe four factors for assessing adults’ expertise. These are: domain general-skill, 
statistical numeracy (i.e. practical probabilistic reasoning), specialized knowledge, and 
cognitive abilities. From these four factors, we are interested in the relationship between 
the development of decision-making and statistical numeracy. 
This relationship has been largely documented from an epistemological, psychological 
and ontological points of view, concluding that the complex multifaceted notion of 
decision has emerged simultaneously to the concept of randomness and probability 
(Cokely et al., 2018). The ideas of randomness and probability can be seen to range 
along an ontological and epistemological spectrum (Saldanha &Liu 2014). On one end 
of the spectrum is a deterministic stance, in which randomness and probability are 
regarded not as inherent features of objetive nature, but rather as residing wholly in the 
mind as an expression of our ignorance of the causes of actions, and therefore of the 
true deterministic course of events. On the other end of the spectrum, randomness and 
probability are seen as inherent features of nature in which genuinely statistical 
sequences are thought to exist. Coherently with this framework, we also envision the 
ideas of decision to range along an ontological and epistemological spectrum. On one 
end of the spectrum are personal decisions based in the ignorance of the random nature 
of the event. On the other end of the spectrum, decisions under situations of risk in 
which the probabilistic distribution of the random events is genuinely recognised. From 
an ontological point of view, the different views on this spectrum emerge from 
questioning what decision, randomness and probability are.  
Roughtly speaking the meanings of decision, randomness and probability are connected 
though the concept of judgement. In the stochastic field, there is much research on 
random sequences and the individual judgement of probability of sequences that have to 
be compared (e.g. Chernoff, 2013) that would help individuals to make decisions; 
however, there is less research about the influence of judgements on decision making. 
When conceptualizing the notion of decision, historically researchers on the field have 
distinguished between judgements (e.g. estimates) and decisions (e.g. choices). 
Assimilating the concept of decision with “a choice of action –of what to do or not to 
do” (Baron, 2008, pp. 6) is basing it on the beliefs about what actions will achieve 
personal goals. In concordance, we are going to speak about decisions based on 
personal preference. In decisions based on personal preference, individuals do not need 
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to look up the data to see if they decisions would work. Individuals could ignore totally 
the data on hand or might try a holistic estimate first (Baron, 2008). 
2.1. Decisions based on personal preference and the ignorance of chance 
In the case that individuals totally ignore the data on hand, we presume that in their 
decisions three primitive ideas of chance will arose, such as: believing in a destiny 
predetermined by God or spirits, assuming personal chance factor, unequal for different 
individuals or accepting natural necessity (Batanero, Henry, & Parzysz, 2005). The first 
idea of chance, believing in a destinity predetermined by God, is prescribing to 
randomness a divine nature. Randomness, in this case, is the expression of God’s will 
(Borovcnik, 2018). The second one, assuming personal chance factor, means opossing 
reasons to causality and accepting that randomness has not specific causes 
independently to the specific conditions in an experiment.  
In Ancient times, craftmanships were used as randomisers for decision making. Those 
objects exhibited perfect symmetries and helped to understand the structural 
homogeneity of the shapes as a relationship between symmetry and randomness 
(Gandhi, 2018). Finally, the acceptance of a natural necessity of the object emerge 
gradually as a consequence of neglecting the deterministic nature (Saldanha & Liu, 
2014). This epistemological point of view proposed by Saldanha and Liu, (2014) is 
coherent with the ontological proposal of Piaget and Inheler (1975) of the development 
of the idea of necessity. 
2.2.Decisions based on personal preference relying on probabilistic heuristics and 
biases 
Piaget and Inhelder (1975) confirmed the existence of three stages in the development 
of the idea of necessity for the complex understanding of chance and probability. In the 
first one, children do not distinguish possible from necessary events. In the second 
stage, children begin to differentiate between the necessary and the possible. Finally, 
children translate unpredictable and incomprenhensible chance into a system of 
operations that are still incomplete and effected unsystematically.  
If there is incomplete information, people would have to rely on heuristics to bridge the 
lack of information which is not available by assumptions biased by heuristic strategies 
(Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2011). Five heuristics and biases in probability have been 
studied for its importance when making decisions (Baron, 2008). Those are: the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), the subadditivity in frequency judgements (Mumford & 
Dawes, 1999), the hindsight bias in replications (Slovic & Fischloff, 1977) and the 
averaging (Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983). 
People often rely on simple heuristics to empower effective decision making when they 
have limited time, knowledge (e.g. numerical or stochastical) and cognitive resources 
(Cokely et al. 2018). This empowerment would provide people with rational decision 
standards. 
Ana Serradó 
 
5       
 
 
2.3. Decisions rationally bounded and the emergence of the mathematical 
conceptualization of randomness 
Consequently, a new paradigm for understanding decision making will emerge in this 
spectrum that goes from the decisions based on personal preference to decisions of risk. 
This paradigm defines decision as “the outcome of an inference problem using both a 
prediction and investigation of the current case’s merits”  (Chen, Moskowitz, & Shue, 
2016, p. 1185). These are rationally, normatively superior decisions that can be defined 
by optimization analysis, which coherently integrate values, goals, preferences, and 
constrains. This integration is made according with standards of logic, probability and 
statistics (Cokely et al. 2018, Baron, 2008). One of the most influential standards 
emerged in 1654 when Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat wrote about the glambling 
problem. Their letters became the founding documents of the logical system at the heart 
of modern science: decision and probability theory (Hacking, 2006).  
On those initial developments of the decision theory, randomness was related to 
equiprobability; because they were closely linked to games of chance, for which the 
principle of equal probabilities is reasonable (Batanero & Serrano, 1999). In spite of the 
existence of games of chance (such as, IAB presented in this paper) in which the 
principle of equal probabilities is not reasonable; the equiprobability bias emerges 
(Lecoutre, 1992), and remains remarkably stable across all ages (Pratt, 2000). The 
emergence of this equiprobability bias constricts the possible decisions between the 
different members of the class, because subjects only consider randomness when all the 
possible results are equally probably (Batanero, 2016).  
Meanwhile, when it is accepted the existence of multiple possibilities in the same 
conditions, a new paradigm for randomness as uncertainty, emerges (Batanero, 2016). 
Coherently, we can talk about decisions made under situations of uncertainty. The 
critizism, about the definition of randomness as equiprobability made by Kyburg 
(1974), applies for randomness as uncertainty since imposes that the object is a random 
member of a class if the class is finite. In consequence, under this paradigm for 
randomness, decisions made under situations of uncertainty can only be carried out if 
the class is finite. 
Even though the class would be finite,  discerning between favourable and possible 
outcomes can be paradoxical (Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014). This paradoxe has 
consequences in understanding the compound events, because students do not 
appreciate the relevance of order among singleton events (Batanero, et al. , 1997). In 
such cases, the line between favourable, unfavourable and possible judgements for 
decision making has to be drawn by the theoretical winning probability. That means 
understanding the proportional relationship of the quantities that are involved (Saldanha 
& Liu, 2014) 
2.4. Local and global decisions under uncertainty 
In consequence, a second paradox may emerge, when those probabilities are linked to 
the relative frequencies, because the expected value may differ from the theoretical one. 
Deepening in the meaning of this last paradox means understanding that the relative 
frequencies are based on independently repeating a random experiment. There are many 
idiosyncratic perceptions about how randomness manifest in repeated trials (Borovcnik 
& Kapadia, 2011). Those subject who base their perceptions in short-term behaviour of 
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the frequencies may wrongly and intuitively think that an experiment which is random 
has a unique formulation. And, consequently, rationally bounded their decisions under 
uncertainty on the local judgement of the randomness on this short-term behaviour of 
the frequencies. We have used the term local, for describing the local decisions under 
uncertainty in coherence with the closed descriptions of the local perception of 
randomness made by Toohey (1995) and Pratt (2000). 
Contrarily, a global perception of randomness involves the students’ understanding of 
patterns in the long run and in the distributions (Pratt, 2000). Meanwhile, Toohey 
(1995) speaks exclusively that the global perspective is reliant on the frequency 
distribution of different outcomes; Pratt (2000) goes further and talks about global 
resources. Three global resources would provide an aggregated overall view of the 
stochastic nature of the situation, which are: (a) probability, the proportion of outcomes 
for each possibility is predictable; (b) large numbers, the proportion of prior results for 
each possibility in the sample space will stabilize as an increasing number of results is 
considered; and (c) distribution, the observer is able to exert control over these 
proportions through manipulation of the sample space.  
If the decisions are based on the use of these three global resources, we are going to talk 
about global rationally bounded decisions under uncertainty. Despite the advance that 
using these three global resources would mean for decision making, Nilsson, Eckert and 
Pratt (2018) inform about the students’ difficulties in understanding the difference 
between drawing conclusions based on global (long-term) and local (short-term) 
behaviour of a data. They claim that it would be critical for understanding this 
difference, the discussion of the relationship of sample size for the bi-directional 
relationship between the proportions of a sample space and the relative frequencies in a 
sample. Under this global understanding relies the relationship between a classical a 
priori and a frequentist model of probability (Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014). 
Acknowledging this relationship means giving an accurate meaning to the sample 
distribution and the stable frequency distribution; and, in coherence basing these global 
rationally bounded decisions in the distribution known. According to Knight (1921), in 
this situation where the distribution is know it will involve risk. And, the decions made 
globally bounded recognising the complex meaning of the distribution will be decisions 
made under a situation of risk. 
Summing up, we have presented in this section a theoretical background to gain insights 
about the random nature granted to the experiment, the events and sequences of events 
and the decisions made. The schema presented informs about the evolution on the 
construction of the notion of decision coherently to the historical grown of the notion of 
randomness and probability. On the one end of this schema, there are the decisions 
based on personal preference; on the other end, there are the global rationally bounded 
decisions mader under a situation of risk.  
3. Methodology 
Integer Addition Bingo [IAB] is a game of chance based on the game of bingo (Serradó, 
2018). In bingo, each player has a card arrangement filled with different numbers. 
Numbers are called out randomly, and players mark the numbers on their cards if they 
are called. Players complete against one another to be the first to have a winning 
arrangement. The IAB cards have ten numbers from -10 to +10. Unlikely in traditional 
bingo, the numbers are not called out. Rather, students watch as an applet randomly 
generates two numbers from -5 to +6. Students mentally add the two numbers, and if the 
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number result of the addition is on their card, they mark the result on it. The first student 
to have marked all of the numbers on their card wins the game.  
In 2015, an IAB task was designed and implemented to 48 Grade 7 students (ages 12-
14) in a Spanish middle school located in a low socio-economic coastal city. In the 
retrospective analysis presented in Serradó (2018), we argued that students reasoning 
was constricted by a deterministic view of the game of chance (IAB generator). And, 
students’ had difficulties in discerning between the randomness of the generator, the 
randomness of the events and the sequences of events. To surpass these difficulties, 
Serradó (2018) suggested to initiate a second cycle of DBR through improving the IAB 
task design.  
In 2016, the IAB task was revised with the aim of: (a) reducing the number of sessions; 
(b) include questions to individually and cooperatively discuss about the randomness of 
the generator and sequences of events; and (c) promoting deliberate dialogue about 
students’ decisions about the election of the card or its construction. In 2017, this 
revised version of the IAB task was implemented during four sessions of one hour to 30 
students grade 10 (ages 15-17). Twenty-eight of these students participated also in the 
2015 implementation of the task and two students did not have previous knowledge of 
the task or of probability. Students were involved in a sequential process of playing 
IAB, doing mathematics, and dialoguing about the decisions made. We have 
retrospectively analysed the recordings and videotapes of the deliberate dialogue about 
the decisions made by the students to elect and/or contruct the cards to play with. On 
those deliberate dialogues, we have identified the random nature granted to the IAB 
generator, the events and sequences of events generated. In the next section, we present 
the results of this retrospective analysis. 
4. Results and discussion 
After playing all the students with the same cards, they initiated a deliberate dialogue 
about which numbers would appear in the next game. 
 
In this initial dialogue, we observe the successive emergence of different 
conceptualizations of randomness. Firstly, students assumed a personal chance factor 
accepting that randomness has not specific causes due to the inexistence of a pattern 
(Batanero, et al., 2005). There was a student that questioned the existence of multiple 
possibilities in the same conditions, as a new paradigm for randomness as uncertainty 
(Batanero, 2016).  For one of the students was reasonable to argue based on the 
principle of equal probabilities (Batanero & Serrano,1999); although this principle is not 
reasonable in this case. We consider that the equiprobability bias emerged (Lecoutre, 
16 J I have written that it is possible that we get the same numbers and that it is possible that we 
don't get them. Because it is a chance game and it has not a pre-established order. Because it 
has a different order if it is between some limits. 
17 T Do you agree? Do you want to add something else? 
18 N Are these multiple possibilities? 
19 T There exist multiple possibilities.  
20 All Yes? 
21 T Why? 
22 M Because they have the same probability of appearing. 
23 V Because they are equally likely outcomes 
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1992). And, comparing the data of this student V, with the previous data obtained in 
2015, we can confirm that this bias has remained remarkably stable (Pratt, 2000). 
Under this understanding of the random nature of the IAB game, students made their 
first decisions by electing between four cards (card C1: +0, +0, +0, +0, +0, +0, +0, +0, 
+0, +0; card C2: -10, -9, -8, -7, -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1; card C3: -10, -8, -6, -4, -2, +2, +2, 
+4, +6, +8, +10; and card C4: -9, -8, -5, -5, +1, +3, +4, +10, +10, +10). The deliberate 
dialogue describing their elections is related with the propensity of appearing some 
numbers. 
70 Ta I have chosen the second card, because this card has positive and negative [numbers], big 
and small. It has more possibilities of winning that other that had only positive or 
negative numbers. 
71 T Does somebody want to argue differently? 
72 C I do not agree with T, because I think that the second card do not have zero and it is the 
number with highest frequency [of appearance]. So, I selected the fourth card that the 
numbers are repeated twice and the numbers are close to zero. And, I did not chose the 
first, because all the numbers are zero and the fact that there are so many repeated. You 
can lose. 
74 MG. I have elected the zero, because the zero is the number to be repeated more times. If it 
appears more times, ok? 
75 Á I agree with C. I have elected the fourth card because it has the same number of positive 
numbers and negative ones. It has not pattern, like the second one that has even numbers. 
It has twice the cero, that it is the number with higher possibility of appearance. In some 
sense, I agree with MG, but not completely, because sometimes the zero it is not going to 
appear. And, finally there is variability in the order of the numbers. 
 
Student Ta reasoned about her decisions based in the representativeness that positive 
and negative numbers have in the whole class of possible outcomes. We consider that 
her decision is based on her personal preference, relying in her decisions the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman &Tversky, 1973). Meanwhile, when the student 
C does not agree with student Ta, she describes her rationally bounded decision based 
on a model of randomness as uncertainty (Batanero, 2016). On expressing her rationally 
bounded decision, the ongoing dialogue of the students advanced making judgements 
based on their understanding of the proportional relationship of the quantities that are 
involved (Saldanha & Liu, 2014).  
On this deliberate dialogue, the student Á confronts the other students with the fact that: 
“the zero is the number with higher possibility of appearance […] sometimes the zero is 
not going to appear” (student Á). In words of Borovcnik and Kapadia (2014), students 
are confronted with one of the paradoxes that can emerge when discerning between 
favourable and possible outcomes.  
The student Á also points out the inexistence of patterns in the cards. In coherence with 
the theoretical framework presented by Pratt (2000) and Toohey (1995), this remark 
could be an expression of the global perception of the resource. It means that he had the 
intuition about the aggregate overall view of the stochastic nature of the pseudo-
randomizer. The dialogue continues deepening in their understanding of the random 
nature of the IAB generator, their outcomes and events. 
91 Mt It has failed, because there is a high variability of numbers. There is the same amount of 
positive and negative numbers. 
92 T Ok? Has she looked for some kind of symmetry? 
93 S Yes, 
94 T She has opted for the symmetry of the card. Does somebody want to refute the idea, improve 
it or integrate it?  
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95 R I want to add to the conclusion of Mt that, because it is a chance game, the outcomes are 
going to be different. 
96 T Because it is a chance game, does the outcomes are going to change? I do not know: what 
does it means? 
97 R Let’s see. That the results are random. We are not going to obtain the same outcomes in the 
first game than in the second one. But, it is true, that there is more probable the appearance 
of the numbers closes to zero; however, despite this fact in each throw and each game, the 
events are going to be different. 
 
The student Mt expressed “it has failed” referring to her election of the card C3 that has 
the same number of positive and negative values. She has made her decisions based on 
the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) looking for the existence 
of patterns based on the symmetry of the numbers in the real straight line. She used this 
card as an expression of the symetry of the pseudo-random generator, setting an 
unnatural relationship between the symmetry of the outcomes of the pseudo-randomizer 
and the possible distribution of data. The expression of this structural homogenity of the 
outcomes in the straight line could be an expression of the student understanding of the 
relationship between symetry and randomness (Gandhi, 2018).  
The student R wanted to refute the idea of randomness as symmetry of the pseudo-
randomizer arguing about the sampling distribution. Althought it is true that the 
numbers with higher probability are close to zero, it is still an intuition for the student. 
Her understanding of the data distribution is reduced to the analysis of the variability 
obtained of the outcomes of a particular game and her prediction of the possible 
diferences between samples. Her argumentation using the variability of the data and the 
possible differences between samples informs that the student is surely developing an 
aggregate view of the data that could help her to understand the complexities of the 
sampling distribution (Baker & Gravemeijer, 2004). We interpret that her reasoning has 
been constricted by the hindsight bias (Slovic & Fischloff, 1997), because she has little 
or no objective basis for predicting that the numers wiht higher probability are close to 
zero. Furthermore and according to Toohey (1995), the student R is still adopting a local 
perception of randomness when refuting the Mt decisions based personal preferences. 
Students continue their dialogue deliberating about the random nature of the pseudo-
randomizer and of the outcomes. The student C concludes: 
145 C I want to add, that the random models of the ball and the card are different. Because I 
think that the random model of the balls is multiple possibilities; meanwhile the one of 
the card is equal probabilities. Because you try [to construct the card] in order that you 
have the same number of positive and negative [numbers], a number of zeros, and that 
you would see that the frequency of the previous game it is going to give you a benefice. 
And, yes there is randomness in the sequence. 
146 T In the sequences of numbers that will appear. 
147 C I think that they are going to be random, associated to model of randomness with multiple 
possibilities. 
148 MG. There is dependence, because the order of the balls influence. It is not the same if you 
have first the first ball or the second.  
149 T No, no!! I say: a different sequence of appearance -2, 1, 7, … or -1, 5, 7, … 
150 MG. Ah!! Could be this [model] a lack of information? 
151 T Why? 
152 MG. Because you don't know surely which number is going to appear. You are blind. You 
write the number that you want and you are blind. 
153 R At chance 
154 T Why at chance? 
155 R Because it is the probability that this number has to appear, then when I add…[silence] 
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156 Ta Tell me 
157 Ta I think that it is random, because you have the same possibilities that the first shot will be 
negative or in the second one, and the probability changes [she hesitates]. Yes, it is 
random. That's all. 
 
The student C argued with two different models of randomness. On the one hand, she 
associated the random nature of the IAB generator with the uncertainty of the multiple 
possibilities of the addition of the values of the two balls. In words of Batanero (2016), 
she concieved randomness as uncertainty. On the other hand, when the student C 
affirmed the necessity of a card with the same number of positive and negative numbers 
or zeros, her decisions would be constricted by a equiprobability bias (Batanero, 2016; 
Lecoutre, 1992). Finally, the student expressed her intuitions about the random nature of 
the sequence of events based on the multiple possibilities of this uncertain situation. 
Although the teacher wanted that all the students advance on deliberating about the 
randomness of the sequence of events; the students were unable to express their beliefs, 
because they still did not captured the essence of the compound event of the addition of 
the numbers of two balls. The student MG and Ta appreciate the relevance of order 
among singleton events (Batanero, et al. , 1997); however, they wanted to stablish some 
dependence between those singleton events that did not help them to understand the 
compound event. Borovcnik and Kapadia (2014) analysed this paradoxe between the 
behaviour of singleton and compound events essential to understand the randomness 
under situations of uncertainty if the class is finite. Furthermore, Abrahamson (2012) 
suggested that an appropiate mathematical analysis of compound events needs of the 
understanding of the pre-symbolic notions of probabilities using the event space on 
hand. Coherently with this research, we think that the teacher should, before advancing 
in the understanding the randomness of sequences of events, deepen on students 
understanding of the theoretical probability distribution of the singleton events and 
compare it with the ones of the compound events. 
A second paradoxe, expressed by Borovcnik and Kapadia (2014), emerged when 
students deliberate between the link between the probability and the relative 
frequencies. 
260 MG That now we have written the zero several times, thinking that it was the most probable? 
But, no, it has appeared only once. 
261 T Theoretically, it has more possibilities of appearance. But? 
262 S But, this does not determine that it is going to appear. It cannot appear although it has a 
higher probability.  
263 T This does not determine that it is going to appear. Look carefully the word that she has 
used: "It is not determined". Is it deterministic? 
264 A They state: "No. It is random". 
265 T It is random. So, it is true that we know that the zero is the one that has more probabilities. 
But, is it sure that we can obtain a sequence in which the zero is the ones with higher 
frequency? 
266 S No 
267 T Why 
268 Ta Because you are not sure that the zero would appear. 
269 N Because, we have multiple possibilities. It can be deterministic, but it is not the case. 
270 T And, in this case it is not deterministic 
 
Students begin their dialogue discussing again about the expectance of appearance of 
the number zero. They linked the probabilities to the relative frequencies, observing that 
the expected value may differ from the theoretical one (Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014). 
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Students were able to abstract the idiosincratic perceptions of the sequence of events of 
on short-runs (Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2011) to conclude that the short-term behaviour of 
the frequencies has not a unique determinated formulation. Although students had still a 
local perception of randomness (Pratt, 2000; Toohney, 1995) teacher made them 
imagine what could happen with long-runs. 
271 T Let's our mind to fly! Think about what could happen if instead of 66 throws, we would have 
350. I know that Fran is the winner, but that the game would have needed 350. What do you 
think it could have happened? 
272 JR Could have the zero appeared more times? 
273 T That the zero could have appeared more times. 
274 C That the relative frequency would have been smaller, because if you make a quotient with 
more numbers. This must be smaller. 
275 T But, he says that it would appear more times. 
276 N Then, it would be bigger. 
277 T Would be it bigger or not? 
 
We consider that the students began to capture the agregate view of the stochastic nature 
of the situation, although they had problems on discerning the proportional relationships 
of the quantities that were involved (Saldanha & Liu, 2014). In coherence with the 
theoretical framework of Pratt (2000) about the global perception of randomness, we 
consider that the students had difficulties in discerning that the proportion of outcomes 
for each possibility was predictable. Although the students had difficulties in discerning 
those proportions, they were able to capture the similarity between the frequencies of 
each outcomes in long-runs with the theoretical probability when they visualize the 
situation. 
278 A That the relative frequency could be similar to the probability 
279 T Do you know what A argued about? 
280 S Yes! 
281 T He has argued more to the … 
282 N Probability 
285 MG If you have more throws, the relative frequency increases and it looks like the possibility 
286 T I have not used the word possibility. I have referred to theoretical probability. 
287 N And, it is repeated many times, and then it tends to be stable. 
288 T If you repeat it many times, then it tends to stabilize. Does this argument works for you? 
289 S [Affirm] Yes 
 
Furthermore, they discussed about the stabilization of the frequency distribution when 
increasing the number of runs, providing a first insight about the behaviour of long runs 
in relation to the law of large numbers. According with Pratt (2000) this was a second 
condition four understanding the aggregate overall view of the stochastic nature of the 
situation. Despite the advance on conceptualizing the random nature of the situation, we 
observe that the student MG still hesitates when distinguishing between probability and 
possibility. We acknowledge the importance of the remark of Nilsson et al. (2018) about 
the need to take fine-grained account of the social and situational nature of how students 
express and develop an understanding of randomness and probability in particular 
learning environments, which aim to examine the opportunities for stablishing the bi-
directional relationship between a classical a priori and a frequentist model of 
probability. In consequence, the teacher continues interrogating students about the 
difference between the stable frequency distribution and the theoretical one when 
increasing the runs. 
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292 S The distribution of a sample of 500 throws is much more likely the theoretical, no? 
293 T And, Has it any relation with the concept use by N of smoothing? 
294 S Yes? 
295 T I have made the question! Is there any relationship with smoothing? 
296 MG Yes 
297 T Then, when the number of throws increases, that in this case is the sample size, what does 
it happen? 
298 MC It smoothens 
299 T Does it smoothen? One, one, because I get lost! 
301 ML. But, it never is going to be the same than the theoretical probability.  
302 T Never it is going to have the same value than the theoretical probability. But, what is it 
always going to happen? 
303 Á I will be close to it. 
304 T Tell me 
305 C And, every time the difference will be smaller. 
 
The students discussed with the help of the teacher about the smotheness of the 
frequency distributions when the number of runs increases and compared these 
distributions with the sampling distribution. We understand that the expressions using 
“close to it” or “the difference will be smaller” refer to the description of the sample 
distribution and the stable frequency distribution. The students advanced in the 
understanding of the concept of sample and sampling distribution, although they did not 
capture all the stochastic nature that the aggregate view of this distributions (Pratt, 
2000) could give them to understand the global resource of the situation. These 
argumentations helped students to recognise the risk involving the construction of the 
cards and, in coherence, they used the sample distribution to make decisions under the 
situation of risk (e.g. “I will construct the card using the theoretical [one], because it is 
the best [distribution] that is closed to what it is going to happen” (student A). 
5. Final discussion and conclusions 
We have presented a DBR with the aim of analysing the evolution of students reasoning 
during the social and situated deliberate dialogue about the relationship stablished 
between the random nature granted to the IAB game, the events and sequences of events 
generated and the decisions made. 
Theoretically, we have presented a scheme that informs about the evolution of the 
construction of the notion of decision making coherent with the historical grown of the 
notion of randomness and probability. On the one end of this schema, there are the 
decisions based on personal preference linked with three primitive ideas of chance. 
Those are believing in a destinity predetermined by God or spirits, assuming personal 
chance factor, unequal for different individuals or accepting natural necessity (Batanero, 
Henry and Parzysz, 2005). On the other end, there are the global rationally bounded 
decisions made under a situation of risk (Knight, 1921) that means understanding the 
aggregate overall view of the stochastic nature of the situation, the probability, the large 
numbers and the distributions involved. 
This theoreticall framework has helped to retrospectively analyse students’ deliberate 
dialogue about the the random nature granted to the IAB situation. Students initially 
based their decisions on the necessity of understanding the random nature of the game 
generator. The lack of information made the emergence of some heuristics and bias, 
which were: the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), the 
hindsight bias (Slovic & Fischloff, 1997) and the equiprobability bias (Lecoutre, 1992). 
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Surpassing those heuristics and biases meant students’ reasoning evolution on their 
understanding of the random nature of the IAB generator as the uncertainty of the 
situation (Batanero, 2016); and, in coherence, deliberating about the decisions made 
rationally bounded on the uncertainty of the situation. After understanding the random 
nature of the situation, students were confronted to deliberate about the decisions made 
and the random nature of the events obtained from the addition of two singleton events. 
Nevertheless, the students were unable to express their beliefs about the essence of the 
compound event. These results are coherent with the conclusions obtained by Batanero, 
et al. (1997) for students of the same age.  
Students analysed the sequences of events obtained by short-runs of the IAB pseudo-
randomizer. On those short-runs, they were able to abstract the idiosincratic percetion of 
the sequence of events (Borovnick & Kapadia, 2011). Students advanced on the 
understanding of the global perception of randomness when they began to capture an 
aggregate view of the stochastic nature of the situation in long-runs (Pratt, 2000). 
Describing the rationally bounded decisions made for constructing a card to win and  
comparing long-runs of different sizes helped students to gain insights about the IAB 
global resource. They reasoned about the stabilization of the distribution of frequencies 
and stablished a bi-directional relationship between the theoretical sample distribution 
and the stable frequentist distribution model. The students made their final decisions 
globally and rationally based on knowledge about the stabilized frequencies distribution 
and the theoretical one. 
Summing up, students description of their decision made to elect and construct the cards 
to win in the IAB game have evolved simultaneously with the evolution of their 
conception about the randomness of the situation. Initally, students made decisions 
based on their personal preference based on the ignorance of the chance. A first, 
evolution of their decisions based on the uncertainty of the situation emerge when they 
were able to capture the multiple possibilities of the outcomes obtained in the random 
generator. Finally, students made globally rationally bounded decisions based in their 
understanding of stochastical nature of the IAB. 
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